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Abstract
We present theory and evidence of the impact of input trade costs on job ﬂows. We
construct a heterogeneous-ﬁrm model of trade in intermediate inputs that derives effects
ofinputtradecostsonboththeextensive(duetobirthsanddeathsofﬁrms)andintensive
(due to expansions and contractions of ﬁrms) margins of employment. After a decline in
input trade costs, the model predicts job destruction by death and contraction for non-
importing ﬁrms, an ambiguous response for importing ﬁrms, a decline in the number of
ﬁrms, and overall job destruction. Using a longitudinal database containing the universe
of manufacturing establishments in California from 1992 to 2004, we ﬁnd the relation-
ship between job ﬂows and input trade costs to be largely consistent with the theoretical
predictions of our model.
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The recent surge in input trade by U.S. ﬁrms coincided with large changes in domestic em-
ployment levels. In the U.S. computer and peripheral equipment industry, for example, the
rise in input trade coincided with the sharpest decline in employment in the industry’s his-
tory: according to the Quarterly Census of Employment & Wages (QCEW) of the Bureau of
Labor Statistics(BLS), theindustry lostabout 44%of its workforcefrom 2001to 2010. In com-
parison, the number of establishments in the industry declined by 28% over the same period.
The large difference between the change in employment and the change in the number of es-
tablishments suggests different levels of importance for the intensive and extensive margins
of employment—the intensive margin refers to job ﬂows due to expansions and contractions
of existing ﬁrms’ employment, and the extensive margin refers to job ﬂows due to births and
deaths of ﬁrms. To what extent are the changes in job ﬂows related to better input trade con-
ditions? In this paper we analyze the impact of trade liberalization—as measured by lower
input trade costs—on each of the components of the intensive and extensive margins of em-
ployment.
For this purpose, ﬁrst we introduce a model of trade in intermediate inputs and job ﬂows
whose main ingredients are heterogeneous ﬁrms ` a la Melitz (2003) and heterogeneous input
trade costs in the spirit of Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008). In this model, a change
in the ﬁxed or variable cost of trading inputs has an impact on the four components of job
ﬂows: job creation by the expansion of existing ﬁrms, job creation by the birth of ﬁrms, job
destruction by the contraction of existing ﬁrms, and job destruction by the death of ﬁrms. We
then provide empirical evidence consistent with the model’s predictions using a longitudinal
database that includes the universe of establishments in California’s manufacturing industry
from 1992 to 2004.
Our model has two sectors: a differentiated-good sector and a homogeneous-good sector
that serves as the numeraire. Firms in the differentiated-good sector are heterogeneous with
respect to their productivity and assemble goods using a continuum of inputs. As in Melitz
(2003), a differentiated-good ﬁrm knows its productivity only after incurring a sunk entry
cost. If the productivity draw is good enough to cover the ﬁxed cost of operating, then the
ﬁrm undertakes production. Otherwise, it exits immediately. Moreover, after learning its
productivity,aﬁrmalsohastodecidewhatfractionofinputsitwantstoproducedomestically
and what fraction to import. There are both ﬁxed and variable costs of trading inputs. The
inputs are ordered such that the variable cost of trading is higher for higher-indexed inputs.
In this setting, we show that only some high-productivity ﬁrms import inputs.
The model shows that a decrease in the variable cost of trading inputs affects job ﬂows at
the intensive margin through three channels. First, the fraction of traded inputs increases,
which reduces the domestic employment of importing ﬁrms. We call this the job-relocation
effect. Second, importing ﬁrms become more productive as a result of lower input costs. This
allowsthemtoincreasetheirmarketshareandhencetoincreasetheirdomesticemployment.
This is the productivity effect of input trade. Lastly, as the competitive environment becomes
1tougher due to the decline in prices of importing ﬁrms, proﬁts are negatively affected, and
ﬁrms reduce their employment. We call this the market-access effect. Since non-importing
ﬁrms experience only the market-access effect, they reduce their employment (job destruc-
tion by contraction). Due to the offsetting productivity effect, the employment response of
importing ﬁrms is ambiguous.
At the extensive margin of employment, the model implies a decrease in the steady-state
mass of ﬁrms as the variable cost of input trade declines. This is caused by the exit of some
low productivity non-importing ﬁrms, which cannot survive the competition from (the now
more productive) importing ﬁrms. Hence, there is net job destruction at the extensive mar-
gin. Overall, the net effect of a decline in the input trade cost on the differentiated-good sec-
tor’s employment is job destruction. That is, the net job destruction at the extensive margin
dominates any possible positive effect at the intensive margin.
Fromabroaderperspective, thetheoreticalcontributionofourpaperliesinanalyzingthe
impact of a decrease in input trade costs on the reallocation resources within a ﬁrm, across
ﬁrms within an industry, and across industries. In particular, we identify job-relocation and
productivityeffectsthatleadtowithin-ﬁrmreallocationofresources,whilethemarket-access
effect leads to reallocation across ﬁrms within an industry. The model also implies a decrease
in the mass of ﬁrms in the differentiated goods industry, which contributes to a reallocation
of resources away from this industry. That is, resources move away from the industry experi-
encing a reduction in the input trading cost.
Themodel’simplicationstranslateintofourempiricalpredictions. Afteradeclineininput
trade costs, the model predicts (i) job destruction by contraction in low-productivity ﬁrms,
and an ambiguous response in high-productivity ﬁrms; (ii) an increase in the death proba-
bility of low-productivity ﬁrms; (iii) a decline in the number of ﬁrms in the industry; and (iv)
net job destruction at the extensive margin, an ambiguous effect at the intensive margin, and
net job destruction overall.
We have access to a longitudinal establishment-level data set that allows us to study the
relationship between job ﬂows and input trade costs. Given data constraints, our empirical
exercise is not a formal test of the mechanisms identiﬁed in the model, but attempts to verify
if the relationship between job ﬂows and input trade costs is consistent with the predictions
of the model.
Our data is an extract of the National Establishment Time Series (NETS) database that
contains the universe of manufacturing establishments in California from 1992 to 2004. After
showing that employment changes in California’s manufacturing industry closely track na-
tional manufacturing employment changes, we use employment levels from the NETS data
tocreateourestablishment-leveljob-ﬂowvariables. Eachestablishmentisclassiﬁedintoone
of390manufacturingindustriesand,basedontheestablishment’ssalesperworker,wecreate
a measure of relative productivity with respect to the establishment’s industry peers.
Our input trade costs are created as follows. We ﬁrst calculate industry output tariffs from
the U.S. trade database of Feenstra, Romalis, and Schott (2002), and then we compute each
industry’s input tariff as a weighted average of the output tariffs. Following the approach
2of Amiti and Konings (2007), we use the U.S. input-output matrix to calculate the weight of
industry j’s output tariff in the input tariff of industry i, as the share of industry j in industry
i’s total purchases.
We divide the empirical analysis in two parts: an establishment-level estimation (for the
ﬁrst and second predictions), and an industry-level estimation (for the third and fourth pre-
dictions). Moreover, in each of the regressions we control for output trade costs. This allows
us to compare the empirical relevance for job ﬂows of the channels identiﬁed in our model,
against the empirical relevance of the channels implied by heterogeneous-ﬁrm models of
trade in ﬁnal goods.
Ourestablishment-levelestimationresultsareconsistentwiththeﬁrstandsecondpredic-
tions of the model. A decline in input trade costs is related to fewer job expansions and more
job contractions for low-productivity establishments, and the opposite for high-productivity
establishments. For the net effect at the intensive margin, we observe net job expansions
even for the median-productivity establishment. This result suggests a strong productivity
effect, whichdominatesthejob-relocationandmarket-accesseffectsforestablishmentswith
productivity levels on or above the median. Consistent with the second prediction, we ﬁnd
statistically signiﬁcant evidence of an increase in the probability of low-productivity estab-
lishments dying after a decline in input trade costs. With respect to the effects of output
trade costs in the establishment-level estimation, we ﬁnd evidence consistent with the pre-
dictions on job ﬂows given by heterogeneous-ﬁrm models of trade in ﬁnal goods. However,
at the intensive margin of employment, input trade costs are far more important than output
trade costs for almost every type of establishment. In the probability-of-death regressions,
although the input-trade-cost effect is larger in magnitude, the difference between it and the
output-trade-cost effect is not statistically signiﬁcant.
In our theoretical model, we do not take into account industry-level heterogeneity. Em-
pirically, however, it is important to recognize that the effects of trade costs can differ from
industry to industry. Hence, in the industry-level estimation, we introduce two measures of
industry comparative advantage that allow us to capture a different effect for each industry.
The ﬁrst measure of comparative advantage is based on the ratio of non-production workers
tototalemployment,andthesecondisbasedontotalfactorproductivitygrowth. Weﬁndem-
pirical evidence consistent with the third and fourth predictions of our model only for indus-
tries with comparative disadvantage. For these industries, the evidence we ﬁnd is similar to
the story described for the U.S. computer manufacturing industry in the opening paragraph
of this paper: after a decline in input trade costs, the number of establishments and the level
ofemploymentdecreases;however,thedeathofestablishmentsexplainsonlyasmallfraction
of total job destruction.1 As in the establishment-level estimation, the industry-level effects
of input trade costs are stronger than the effects of output trade costs.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 highlights our paper’s contribution relative to
1We are implicitly assuming that the establishments that died in the U.S. computer manufacturing industry
are the smallest (and least productive) ones. Given the large empirical literature on ﬁrm heterogeneity (see, for
example, Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott, 2007), this is a safe assumption, as an important stylized fact is
that more productive ﬁrms are also larger.
3theextantliterature. Section3presentsthemodelandsection4showsitsimplicationsforthe
responses of job ﬂows to changes in input trade costs. Section 5 shows some facts about the
U.S.manufacturingindustryandpresentsabriefdescriptionoftheNETS’sCaliforniadata. In
section 6, we perform the establishment- and industry-level estimations of the relationships
between job ﬂows and input trade costs. Finally, section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
IntheMelitz(2003)model, ﬁrmsemployonlydomesticlaborandtradeliberalizationismod-
eled as a reduction in the variable cost of trading ﬁnal goods. The model solves for two cutoff
levels of productivity: one determines the tradability of the good in the domestic market,
while the other—larger than the ﬁrst one—determines the tradability of the good in the ex-
port market. A decline in the iceberg trade cost increases the cutoff level for selling domes-
tically, while reducing the exporting cutoff level: although lower-productivity ﬁrms are now
able to export, the competitive environment becomes tougher and some low-productivity
(non-exporting) ﬁrms are forced to exit. These changes affect gross job ﬂows. Bernard, Red-
ding, and Schott (2007) explicitly address the predictions on gross job ﬂows of Melitz’s model
in their Heckscher-Ohlin heterogeneous-ﬁrm model. They ﬁnd that after trade liberalization
in ﬁnal goods, there is gross job destruction from two sources: the death of ﬁrms with pro-
ductivity levels between the old a new domestic cutoff level, and the contraction of surviving
non-exporting ﬁrms. On the other hand, there is gross job creation by expansion of existing
and new exporting ﬁrms. Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2007) also ﬁnd that the net employ-
ment effect of ﬁnal-good trade liberalization is job creation in industries with comparative
advantage, and job destruction in industries with comparative disadvantage.
In an important departure, this paper models trade liberalization as a reduction in input
trade costs. Because of this difference, our model derives effects on gross job ﬂows that are
absent in the analysis of Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2007). In particular, our model ob-
tains within-ﬁrm effects arising from the input-trade structure: the job-relocation effect and
the productivity effect.2 In the standard Melitz framework there is an aggregate-productivity
increase after trade liberalization in ﬁnal goods (due to both a selection effect—driven by the
exit of low-productivity ﬁrms—and a market-share reallocation towards high-productivity
ﬁrms), but the effective productivity of each ﬁrm never changes. In contrast, in our frame-
work the reduction in input trade costs raises the effective productivity of some ﬁrms by al-
lowing them to import inputs at a cheaper cost. Hence, after a decline in input trade costs,
aggregate productivity increases in our model not only through the exit of low-productivity
ﬁrms—which are driven out by the market-access effect of input trade liberalization—and
market-share reallocations towards more productive ﬁrms, but also through the endogenous
increase in the productivity of ﬁrms that import inputs.
2The input-trade structure in our model is related to the trade-in-tasks structure of the model of Grossman
and Rossi-Hansberg (2008). However, their model does not consider ﬁrm heterogeneity and hence, an extensive-
margin channel is absent from their analysis.
4Although in our theoretical model we abstract from trade in ﬁnal goods (the effects on
job ﬂows would be similar to the effects described by Bernard, Redding, and Schott, 2007), in
the empirical part we do distinguish between input trade costs and output trade costs, and
compare their effects on gross job ﬂows.
The within-ﬁrm productivity effect obtained in our model has strong empirical support.
Amiti and Konings (2007), for example, use plant-level data from Indonesia and show that a
decline in input tariffs increases plant-level productivity.3 Moreover, they ﬁnd that the input
tariffeffectistwiceaslargeastheoutputtariffeffect. Morerecently,TopalovaandKhandelwal
(2011) show similar results using ﬁrm-level data from India, with the difference that in India’s
case the positive effect of a decline in input tariffs on ﬁrm-level productivity is more than ten
times larger than the effect of a similar decline in output tariffs.4 In this paper, we do not look
intotheresponsesofﬁrm-levelproductivitymeasurestoinputtradecosts. Instead, wederive
theoreticallyhowtheproductivityeffect, therelocationeffect, andthemarket-accesseffect—
all driven by a reduction in input trade costs—map into ﬁrm-level employment responses,
and look for evidence of these responses in establishment-level job ﬂows while controlling
for output trade costs.
The focus on gross job ﬂows, rather than on net employment changes, for the analysis of
the effects of trade liberalization on the labor market is particularly relevant in a world with
heterogeneous ﬁrms. It is not only true that net employment changes hide large changes in
gross job ﬂows (see Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger, 2006), but also the magnitude and
direction of employment adjustments differ from ﬁrm to ﬁrm. Using Chilean plant-level data
from 1979 to 1986, a period of trade liberalization, Levinsohn (1999) documents substantial
differences in the rates of job creation and destruction across plants of different sizes: al-
though the smallest plants are three times more likely to destroy jobs by ﬁrm death than the
largest plants, the smallest plants have lower rates of both job creation by expansion and job
destruction by contraction.5 Similarly, Biscourp and Kramarz (2007) use French ﬁrm-level
manufacturingdatafrom1986and1992andﬁndthatthereisastrongerrelationshipbetween
import growth and job destruction for large ﬁrms than for small ﬁrms.
Arelatedareaofresearchhasstudiedtheeffectsofinternationalfactorsongrossjobﬂows.
Klein, Schuh, and Triest (2003) analyze the effects of real exchange rate changes on job ﬂows
using industry-level data for the U.S. manufacturing sector from 1974 to 1993. They decom-
pose the real exchange rate into its trend and cyclical components and ﬁnd that the trend
component has a similar effect on job creation and job destruction (with a nil net effect on
employment),whilethecyclicalcomponenthasaneteffectonemploymentonlythroughjob
destruction. Theyalsoﬁndthatlaborreallocationeffectsarelargerinindustriesthataremore
3See also the references cited therein.
4In a related paper using the same Indian data, Goldberg, Khandelwal, Pavcnik, and Topalova (2010) ﬁnd that
a reduction in input tariffs increases the range of goods that a ﬁrm produces. In particular, they ﬁnd that from
1989 to 1997, the decline in input tariffs in India accounted for 31% of the observed expansion in within-ﬁrm
product scope.
5In advance of the heterogeneous-ﬁrm models of Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003) and Melitz
(2003), Levinsohn concludes his paper by pointing out the need to include heterogeneous ﬁrms in international
trade models in order to account for the observed differences in employment responses.
5open to trade. Along the same lines, Moser, Urban, and di Mauro (2010) study the impact of
real exchange rate changes on job ﬂows using establishment-level data for Germany from
1993 to 2005. Working ﬁrst with a balanced panel (with no establishment births or deaths),
they ﬁnd that the bulk of the employment adjustment to a stronger real exchange rate occurs
through less job creation rather than through increased job destruction. This result, they
argue, is due to rigid labor regulations that make job destruction by contraction very costly
for German ﬁrms. Once they take into account ﬁrms’ deaths—through bankruptcy—job de-
struction becomes relevant.
After a decline in input trade costs, our model predicts an increase in the death likeli-
hood of low-productivity ﬁrms. The empirical approach we follow to see this pattern in data
takes the form of a binary regression at the establishment level, where the dependent vari-
able takes the value of 1 in the year an establishment dies (and zero otherwise). Bernard,
Jensen, and Schott (2006b) work with a similar probability-of-death regression using plant-
level data of U.S. manufacturing industries from 1987 to 1997. They ﬁnd that—as predicted
by heterogeneous-ﬁrm models of trade in ﬁnal goods—a decline in trade costs increases the
death probability of ﬁrms, with a larger increase for low-productivity ﬁrms. Given that the
objective of Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006b) is to test several predictions of the seminal
heterogeneous-ﬁrm models of Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003) and Melitz (2003),
they focus their empirical analysis on output trade costs. In our probability-of-death regres-
sions, however, we are able to gauge the importance of both input and output trade costs.
Inarelatedpaper—andcloserinspirittoastoryoftradeinintermediateinputs—Bernard,
Jensen, and Schott (2006a) study the impact of imports from low-wage countries on plant
survival probabilities and employment growth in the U.S. manufacturing industry from 1977
to 1997. They ﬁnd a negative relationship between plant survival rates and imports from low-
wage countries. As well, they ﬁnd that greater import penetration from low-wage countries
has a negative impact on the employment growth of surviving ﬁrms, with a smaller effect for
capital-intensive plants.6
3 The Model
In this section we present our model with heterogeneous ﬁrms and heterogeneous input
trade costs. The model assumes a country with two sectors: a differentiated-good sector and
a homogeneous-good sector. Production in the homogeneous-good sector uses only domes-
tic labor, but heterogeneous ﬁrms in the differentiated-good sector can import a fraction of
their inputs.
Webeginbydescribingconsumerpreferencesandtheproductionstructure,thenwesolve
the ﬁrm’s input-trade decision problem and derive some results on average prices, produc-
tivity, and the composition of ﬁrms, and lastly, we describe the free-entry condition and solve
the model.
6Supporting the ﬁndings of Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006a), but without looking at job ﬂows, Ebenstein,
Harrison, McMillan, andPhillips(2009)ﬁndthatoffshoringtolow-wagecountriesnegativelyaffectsU.S.employ-
ment, though the effect is small.
63.1 Preferences and Production Structure
Consumers’preferencesaredeﬁnedoveracontinuumofdifferentiatedgoodsintheset
and
a homogeneous good. In particular, let us assume that the utility function for the representa-
tive consumer has the quasi-linear form:








 1 is an aggregator of differentiated goods and x represents
the consumption of the homogeneous—and numeraire—good. In Z, zc(!) denotes the con-
sumption of variety ! and  > 1 represents the elasticity of substitution between differen-
tiated goods. The parameter  captures the intensity of preference for differentiated goods
and, given quasi-linear preferences, is also the amount of expenditure on these goods.
Fromtheutilityfunctionin(1),therepresentativeconsumer’sdemandfunctionforvariety











1  is the price of the basket of
differentiated goods, Z.
Labor is the only factor of production. Each worker-consumer has one unit of labor to
devote to production activities. The total size of the workforce is L. The production function
for the numeraire good is simple: one unit of labor is required to produce one unit of the
good. Hence—assuming that the market for the numeraire good is perfectly competitive—
the domestic wage equals 1. Since each worker spends  on differentiated goods, we assume
0 <  < 1: Therefore, the total expenditure on differentiated goods is L, and the market







is denoted by ', and the distribution of the productivity levels of all differentiated-good pro-
ducers is given by K('), where ' 2 ['min;1). As in Melitz (2003), each ﬁrm must pay a sunk
entry cost of fe in terms of the numeraire good, after which it will observe its realization of
productivity drawn from K(').
Each differentiated good is produced using a continuum of inputs in the interval [0;1]. A
ﬁrm with productivity ' can decide whether or not to import its inputs below ('), where
(') 2 [0;1].7 In particular, the production function for a ﬁrm with productivity ' is given
by z(') = 'Y ('), where










(') = 1, the ﬁrmis producingits good only with foreign labor—aftercovering anytype ofﬁxed
cost. This is equivalent to the import of a ﬁnished good.
7is an inputs aggregator, with yf(';) denoting the ﬁrm’s requirement of foreign input , and
yd(';) denoting the ﬁrm’s requirement of domestic input .
Letusassumethatthereisaﬁxedcostofoperation,f. Wedenotetheproﬁtofaﬁrm,gross
of the ﬁxed cost of operation, by . Therefore, we can deﬁne the zero-proﬁt cutoff productiv-
ity level, ', as the level of productivity such that
(') = f: (5)
Firms with productivity below ' do not produce and exit immediately.
There are ﬁxed and variable costs of trading inputs. If the ﬁrm decides to import inputs,
it must pay a ﬁxed cost of fo units of the numeraire good. The foreign wage is given by w < 1
(also in terms of the numeraire). Moreover, foreign labor is not a perfect substitute for do-
mestic labor. In particular, the production function for input  with country of origin r, for





`d(') if r = d
`f(')
h() if r = f;
(6)
where`r(')denotestheamountofdomestic(d)orforeign(f)labordevotedtotheproduction
of input  and, as in the model of Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), h() > 1 accounts
for the additional costs of making foreign-produced input  compatible with domestic in-
puts. The term h() involves a general component, , and an input-speciﬁc component,
h(). The inputs are ordered by their trade cost so that h() is strictly increasing in . It fol-
lows that the marginal cost of input  equals 1 if the ﬁrm uses domestic labor, and wh() if
the ﬁrm uses foreign labor.
Let Lr(') denote the amount of labor from country r hired by a domestic ﬁrm with pro-
ductivity '. If it imports, it employs `f(') =
Lf(')



























Note that if the ﬁrm does not import, (') = 0 and z(') is just 'Ld('). On the other hand, if
(') = 1, z(') equals 1
'g(1)Lf('). But how does a ﬁrm with productivity ' choose (')?
We now look into the import decisions of ﬁrms in the differentiated-good sector.
83.2 The Firm’s Decision to Import Inputs
The ﬁrm’s decision to import inputs can be broken into two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, a ﬁrm
with productivity ' decides on the fraction of inputs, ('), to import. Given ('), in the
secondstagetheﬁrmdecidesonLd(')andLf(')—theamountofdomesticandforeignlabor,
respectively, to hire. The ﬁrm’s problem is solved backwards. In this section we present the
most important results and leave the details of the solution for section A.1 in the Appendix.8
Given the ﬁxed cost of importing inputs, fo, there exists an importing-inputs cutoff pro-
ductivity level, '
o, which divides existing ﬁrms into importing and non-importing ﬁrms: a
ﬁrm imports inputs if and only if its productivity is no less than '
o (i.e. (') = 0 if ' < '
o).
From the ﬁrst-stage solution, we obtain that a ﬁrm with productivity '  '
o imports a frac-
tion  = h 1   1
w

of inputs. This condition says that in the production of the marginal
input, , the ﬁrm is indifferent between hiring domestic or foreign labor.9 Note that  does
not depend on the ﬁrm’s productivity, '; that is, the proportion of inputs being imported is
the same for all importing ﬁrms ((') =  if '  '
o).
From the second-stage solution, the domestic and foreign labor demands of a ﬁrm with
productivity ' are, respectively, given by























For non-importing ﬁrms, since (') = 0, we obtain (0;) = 1 because g(0) = 1. For im-
porting ﬁrms, the term (;) accounts for the (within-ﬁrm) productivity effect identiﬁed
by Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008). In the Appendix we prove that (;) > 1 for
 2 (0;1].
As '
o separates out non-importing and importing ﬁrms, the gross-proﬁt difference be-
tween an importing ﬁrm with productivity '
o and a non-importing ﬁrm with the same pro-
ductivity level must be identical to the ﬁxed cost of importing inputs, fo.10 In the Appendix,





8The Appendix is available at http://www.socsci.uci.edu/jantonio.
9The marginal cost of producing input 
 using domestic labor is 1, while the marginal cost of producing
input 
 using foreign labor is wh(
).
10For ﬁrms with productivity levels below '

o, gross proﬁts of importing ﬁrms are larger than gross proﬁts for
non-importing ﬁrms, but the difference is not large enough to cover the ﬁxed cost of importing inputs, fo.








o) = fo: (13)
Assuming that ' < '
o, so that there is a set of ﬁrms with productivity levels between '
and '
o, which produce but do not import inputs, we divide equation (13) by (5) to obtain a
relationship between the cutoff rules '
o and ' given by
'
o =  '; (14)
where







Note that in order for ' < '
o, we need to satisfy that fo > f[(;) 1   1] so that   > 1.
We assume this to be the case in the rest of the paper. Intuitively, equation (15) captures
the fact that the larger the ﬁxed cost of importing inputs, fo, the greater the gap between
the importing-inputs cutoff and the zero-proﬁt cutoff. On the other hand, the greater the
productivity beneﬁts of importing inputs captured in (;), the smaller the gap between
theimporting-inputscutoffandthezero-proﬁtcutoff. Inthelattercase,mostofthesurviving
ﬁrms are likely to import inputs. A higher ﬁxed cost of operation, f, also reduces the gap
between the two cutoffs, essentially by making the zero-proﬁt cutoff higher.
3.3 Prices, Average Productivity, and the Mass of Firms
As is usual in heterogeneous-ﬁrm models, we assume that the productivity of ﬁrms is Pareto










'+1, where  is the
parameter of productivity dispersion (a higher  implies less heterogeneity). As in the models
of Chaney (2008) and Ghironi and Melitz (2005), which assume CES preferences and a Pareto
distribution for productivity, our model requires that  >    1 for a solution to exist.












((');)' is the ﬁrm’s marginal cost.










where N denotes the mass of active ﬁrms, and k(' j '  ') is the productivity distribution
10of ﬁrms conditional on successful entry; that is,


























 1 k(' j '  ')d'
# 1
 1
is the average productivity of domestic active producers. Using equations (14), (15) and (18)












We can also derive an expression for the mass of ﬁrms, N. Substituting equation (19) into









Hence, given that ((');) = (0;) = 1 (as ' < '
o), the zero-proﬁt condition in equa-










 ' in equation (20) and plugging in the result in (22), we solve for N as
N =







Note that N is increasing in  . In section 3.2 we point out that   is decreasing in (;),
so that ' and '
o get closer to each other when the productivity effect—as measured by
(;)—increases. It follows that N is also decreasing in (;), as a larger productivity
effect allows importing ﬁrms to capture a larger share of the market through lower prices,
displacing low-productivity ﬁrms.
3.4 The Free-Entry Condition and Equilibrium
AsinMelitz(2003),entryisunbounded. Everyperiod,apotentialﬁrmwillenterifthevalueof
entry is no less than the required sunk entry cost, fe. Given that the potential entrant knows
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Therefore, the value of entry is given by  





Lastly, substituting equation (24) into (25) and replacing N by its equilibrium value in (23),












The model is complete. Once we obtain the equilibrium levels of ', , and N, we can solve
for the rest of the variables.
In steady state, the ﬁrms that die every period due to the exogenous death shock are ex-
actly replaced by the mass of successful entrants. That is, if Ne denotes the mass of entrants
every period, we have that (1   K('))Ne = N, where the left side represents the mass of
successful entrants and the right side represents the mass of dying ﬁrms. Using the Pareto







Therefore, in this model the mass of entrants is constant. As changes in trade costs ( and
fo) do not affect Ne, changes in the mass of successful entrants, (1   K('))Ne, only occur
through the effects of trade costs on '.
4 Input Trade Costs and Job Flows
In this section we discuss the model’s implications for the effects of a change in input trade
costs on the intensive and extensive margins of employment in the differentiated-good sec-
tor. First, we describe the different channels through which input trade costs affect job ﬂows
and present a set of propositions containing the model’s main results, and second, we indi-
cate how these propositions translate into testable empirical predictions.
124.1 The Model’s Main Results
Ourmeasuresofinputtradecostsarethegeneralcomponentofthevariablecostofimporting
inputs, , and the ﬁxed cost of importing inputs, fo. Recall that the importing cost of a unit of
input  is wh() for  2 [0;1] (where h() is the input-speciﬁc component of the importing
cost),sothatadecreaseinimpliesaproportionaldeclineintheimportingcostsofallinputs.
We focus on the impact of a change in , and leave the discussion of a change in fo for the
end of the section.
The expression for the demand for domestic labor of a ﬁrm with productivity ' is given
in equation (9). Upon substituting equation (19) into (9), and then using (22), we can rewrite
the demand for domestic labor as






where (') equals  for an importing ﬁrm and 0 for a non-importing ﬁrm, and ((');)
equals (;) > 1 for an importing ﬁrm and 1 for a non-importing ﬁrm. Using this infor-
mation, we can write Ld(') according to the ﬁrm’s import status, so that Ld(') = Ld
d(') if the
ﬁrm employs only domestic labor, and Ld(') = Lo
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(29)
Therefore, the elasticity of demand for domestic labor with respect to the general input trade






d('); =  (   1)'; if ' 2 [';'
o)
Lo
d('); =   
1 ; + (   1)(;);   (   1)'; if ' 2 ['
o;1);
(30)
where each   ; represents an elasticity with respect to . Note that equation (30) shows
the labor demand response of an existing ﬁrm that does not change its import status after a
change in . It misses, however, the labor demand response of a ﬁrm whose import status
changes: an initially non-importing ﬁrm that starts to import, and vice versa. More explicitly,
in equation (30) we use the importing-inputs cutoff rule, '
o, to separate non-importing and
importing ﬁrms, but '
o also changes with .11 In particular, given that '
o =  ', it follows
that '
o; =  ; + ';. Therefore, if '
o declines after a change in , those ﬁrms between the
new and old '
o face a discontinuity in their domestic labor demands as they begin to import
inputs. Throughout the rest of the section, we point out the differences between the labor
demand responses of ﬁrms that change their import status and ﬁrms that do not change it.
At the intensive margin, we can identify three effects on the demand for domestic la-
11Evidently, '
 also changes with , and hence, equation (30) also ignores the domestic employment loss of a
ﬁrm that dies (if its productivity is below a new and higher '
), and the domestic employment gain of a newborn
ﬁrm (after a decrease in '
). These are employment changes at the extensive margin and are discussed below.
13bor when  changes: a job-relocation effect, a productivity effect, and a market-access ef-
fect. The ﬁrst two effects lead to within-ﬁrm reallocation of resources, while the market-
access effect leads to reallocation of resources across ﬁrms within the industry. For ﬁrms that
do not change their import status, these three effects are respectively given by   
1 ;,
(   1)(;);, and  (   1)'; in equation (30). For the ﬁrms that change their import
status, the effects are respectively accounted for by the magnitude of , the magnitude of
(;), and the change in '. The following lemma presents results that will help us in the
analysis of these intensive-margin effects.
Lemma 1. The elasticities of , (;), ', and   with respect to  are given by
i) ; =  
h()
h0() < 0;
ii) (;); =   < 0;












In our setup, a decrease in the variable cost of trading inputs leads to a greater fraction
of inputs being imported, that is, ; < 0. Since the jobs associated with the production of
these inputs are relocated abroad, we use the term “job relocation” to refer to this effect on
domesticlabor demand. Adecreasein theinputtrade costimprovestheproductivity ofﬁrms
engaged in input trade (as they can purchase abroad a particular input at a lower cost). As
a result, (;) increases as  declines; that is, (;); < 0. The increased productivity of
importing ﬁrms allows them to steal market share from non-importing ﬁrms, and hence to
expand domestic employment. Thus, we label the associated domestic employment change
as “productivity effect.” The lost market share for non-importing ﬁrms—with its negative ef-
fect on gross proﬁts—implies that the productivity required to exactly meet the ﬁxed cost of
production is larger. That is, the cutoff productivity level below which ﬁrms exit, ', rises af-
ter a decline in  ('; < 0). Hence, we label the change in domestic employment associated
with the change in ' a “market-access effect.” Lastly,  —the proportional wedge between '
and '
o—declines after the decrease in  (i.e.  ; > 0). Moreover,  ; dominates ';, which
implies that '
o; =  ; + '; > 0, so that less productive ﬁrms start importing inputs after
thedeclinein. Usingequation(30)andLemma1,wecanwritethefollowingpropositionfor
the effect of a change in the variable cost of trading inputs on ﬁrm-level expansions and/or
contractions of employment.
Proposition 1. (Input trade costs and ﬁrm-level employment)
For domestic active producers (with productivity no less than '), a decline in  decreases
the demand for domestic labor of non-importing ﬁrms, and has an ambiguous effect on the
demand for domestic labor of (new and existing) importing ﬁrms.
Proposition 1 concerns ﬁrm-level decisions on job creation by expansion, and job de-
struction by contraction. For ﬁrms that do not change their import status, the results are
14given by the signs of Ld
d('); and Lo
d('); in equation (30). In particular, the proposition states
that Ld
d('); > 0, and that the sign is ambiguous for Lo
d(');. Note that for non-importing
ﬁrms,onlythemarket-accesseffectmattersafteradeclinein. Theseﬁrmsreleaselabor(job
destructionbycontraction)astheylosemarketsharetomoreproductiveimportingﬁrms. For
old importing ﬁrms, the productivity effect generates an increase in the demand for domes-
tic labor after a decline in . This effect dominates the contraction in domestic labor implied
by the market-access effect (see proof in the Appendix). However, the fraction of imported
inputs increases, so that importing ﬁrms release domestic labor that was employed in the
production of inputs between the old and new . In the end, the effect on the demand for
domestic labor is ambiguous for old importing ﬁrms. For ﬁrms that start importing inputs
after the decline in  (those ﬁrms whose labor demand changes from Ld
d(') to Lo
d(') due to
the decrease in '
o), we observe similar opposing effects. On the one hand, we observe that
as ' increases (market-access effect) and (') changes from 0 to  (job-relocation effect),
the demand for domestic labor decreases. On the other hand, as ((');) moves from 1 to
(;) (productivity effect), the demand for domestic labor increases. As with old import-
ing ﬁrms, the ﬁnal effect on the demand for domestic labor is ambiguous for new importing
ﬁrms.
A change in input trade costs affects the number of ﬁrms in the economy and hence af-
fects employment through the extensive margin as well. From the end of section 3.4, note
that we can write N as




where the number of entrants, Ne, is constant and given by (27). The following proposition
describes the changes in the mass of active ﬁrms when  declines.
Proposition 2. (Input trade costs and the mass of active ﬁrms)
The mass of ﬁrms, N, declines after a decrease in . This decline is completely accounted for
by the death of ﬁrms between the old and new '.
Note that a change in the input trade cost affects N only through its effect on the prob-
ability of successful entry, 1   K('). As ' increases after a decrease in , it follows that
1   K(') declines, and those ﬁrms between the old and new ' die. This result implies net
job destruction at the extensive margin after a decline in .12
Now, we can separate out the extensive- and intensive-margin components of net em-
ployment changes for the industry as a whole. The employment level in the differentiated-
good sector is given by LZ = N  Ld, where  Ld =
R 1
' Ld(')k(' j '  ')d' denotes the average
domestic employment of active ﬁrms. Using equations (31) and (18), we rewrite the total
employment in the differentiated-good sector as LZ = Ne

R 1
















12Although there is job creation from successful entrants, in steady state these jobs exactly replace the job
losses of ﬁrms receiving the death shock.
15Taking the derivative of equation (32) with respect to  (using Leibniz’s rule), we ﬁnd that the
















































The following proposition looks at each of the components of equation (33).
Proposition 3. (Input trade costs and net changes in employment)
A decline in  has the following effects on domestic employment in the differentiated-good
sector:
i) net job destruction at the extensive margin;
ii) an ambiguous net effect at the intensive margin: although there is job destruction by con-
traction in surviving non-importing ﬁrms, there is an ambiguous effect for new and exist-
ing importing ﬁrms;
iii) in spite of the intensive-margin ambiguity, there is net job destruction overall.
The ﬁrst part of Proposition 3—which is also implied by Proposition 2—refers to the pos-
itive sign of the net-extensive-margin component in equation (33): following a decline in ,
the net-extensive-margin component accounts for the destruction of domestic jobs due to
the death of ﬁrms between the old and new '. The second part of Proposition 3 concerns
the signs and relative magnitudes of the three net-intensive-margin components in equa-
tion (33). The ﬁrst net-intensive-margin term accounts for domestic employment changes of
ﬁrms that change their import status, while the second and third terms account for domes-
tic employment expansions or contractions of ﬁrms that do not change their import status
(existing non-importing ﬁrms in the second term, and existing importing ﬁrms in the third
term). Expanding the results in Proposition 1, we obtain that even though surviving non-
importing ﬁrms destroy domestic labor by contraction after a decline in  (positive sign for
the second term), the ambiguous domestic employment response of new and existing im-
porting ﬁrms (ambiguous signs for the ﬁrst and third terms) carries over to the overall net
intensive-margin effect. Lastly, the third part of Proposition 3 refers to the positive sign of
dLZ
d : after a decline in , there is net destruction of domestic employment as the job destruc-
tion at the extensive margin cancels out any possible job creation at the intensive margin.
The implications of a decline in the ﬁxed cost of importing inputs, fo, on job ﬂows are,
in general, similar to the effects of a decline in . The following proposition describes these
results.
16Proposition 4. (The ﬁxed cost of importing inputs and employment)
After a decline in fo:
i) thereisadecreaseinthedemandfordomesticlaborofactiveﬁrmsthatdonotchangetheir
import status, and an ambiguous response in the demand for domestic labor of ﬁrms that
change their import status (new importing ﬁrms);
ii) the mass of ﬁrms and domestic employment respond as in Propositions 2 and 3, with the
exception of a job-destruction response (by contraction) of existing importing ﬁrms—as
opposed to an ambiguous response in Proposition 3 ii).
Compared to the effects of a decline in , the key difference in Proposition 4 comes from
the fact that there are no productivity and job-relocation effects for continuing importing
ﬁrms—note that  and (;) do not depend on fo. As with the employment of continuing
non-importing ﬁrms, the only effect for continuing importing ﬁrms is the market-access ef-
fectandhence,theiremploymentdecreasesafteradeclineinfo. Nevertheless,theproductiv-
ityandjob-relocationeffectsarepresentforﬁrmsthatswitchfromnoimportingtoimporting
inputs, and the impact of a decline in fo on their domestic employment is ambiguous.
4.2 The Model’s Reduced-Form Predictions
Ideally, one would like to test the predictions of the model using ﬁrm-level data on job ﬂows
and input-trade variables (e.g. import status and the fraction of imported inputs by ﬁrm).
However, we do not have ﬁrm-level input-trade data and hence, we rely on reduced-form
predictions based on ﬁrm-level variables on job ﬂows and productivity, and industry-level
input trade costs. Drawing on the previous propositions, we obtain the following reduced-
form relationships between input trade costs and job ﬂows.
Empirical predictions. A decline in variable input trade costs causes:
1. job destruction by contraction in low-productivity ﬁrms and an ambiguous response (ei-
ther job creation by expansion or job destruction by contraction) in high-productivity
ﬁrms;
2. an increase in the death likelihood of low-productivity ﬁrms;
3. a decline in the number of ﬁrms in the industry;
4. net job destruction at the extensive margin, an ambiguous net effect at the intensive mar-
gin, and net job destruction overall.
Under the premise that less productive ﬁrms are less likely to import inputs than more
productive ﬁrms, Prediction 1 follows directly from Proposition 1. Predictions 2 and 3 come
from Proposition 2, as the least productive ﬁrms are expected to die after a decline in input
trade costs, driving a decrease in the number of ﬁrms. Lastly, Prediction 4 follows Proposition
3. With respect to the empirical implications of Proposition 4, Predictions 2, 3, and 4 also
17hold for a decline in the ﬁxed cost of importing inputs; the only difference lies in a part of
Prediction 1, as in this case some of the high-productivity ﬁrms unambiguously destroy labor
by contraction. In the empirical exercise below, however, we consider only variable input
trade costs, and hence focus on the four predictions listed above.
5 The U.S. Manufacturing Industry and the California Data
If we want to understand the relationship between trade costs and job ﬂows in the United
States, manufacturing is the key sector to study.13 Although we do not have access to ﬁrm-
levelemploymentdatafortheentirecountry, weuseanextractoftheNationalEstablishment
Time Series (NETS) database, which contains the universe of establishments in California’s
manufacturing industry from 1992 to 2004.
In this section, ﬁrst we describe general facts about the U.S. manufacturing industry; sec-
ond, we present evidence of the high correlation between employment in California and in
theentirecountry;third,toverifythereliabilityofCalifornia’sNETSdata,wecompareittoag-
gregate employment measures for California from the Quarterly Census of Employment and
Wages (QCEW) of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS); and fourth, using our data, we present
some stylized facts about the evolution of the different components of job ﬂows.
Figure1presentsgeneralfactsabouttheU.S.manufacturingindustry. Figure1ashowsthe
evolution of the employment level and real GDP in manufacturing since 1949. The volatility
of the employment level is substantial. Moreover, from 2000 to 2003, the manufacturing in-
dustry suffered its largest employment change in a three-year period, with a loss of about
2.86 million jobs.14 Although this represents the loss of 16.4% of manufacturing jobs, the real
GDP in the industry fell only about 1.8% over the period. By 2007, even though the employ-
ment level had continued to decline at a moderate pace (nearly reaching its 1949 levels), real
GDP was 13.5% higher than in 2000. Therefore, the decline in the importance of manufac-
turing in total U.S. GDP—as observed in Figure 1b—does not mean that U.S. manufacturing
production is shrinking, but just that it is growing at a slower rate than other sectors of the
economy. Figure 1b shows, however, that manufacturing imports have increased dramati-
cally as proportion of U.S. GDP since 1990, reaching more than 11% by 2008, and very close
to the domestic manufacturing production’s share of GDP .
Californiahasthecountry’slargesteconomyandpopulation. In2007,thestateaccounted
for 13.1% of U.S. GDP and 12% of the country’s population, according to the Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis (BEA) and the Census Bureau.15 It accounted for 11.3% of U.S. manufac-
13According to data from the United States International Trade Commission (USITC), U.S. manufacturing im-
ports accounted for about 92% of the U.S. total non-oil imports for each year from 1990 to 2008. In 2007, the size
of U.S. manufacturing imports was 11.2% as proportion of GDP. Putting this number in perspective with respect
to the three major trading partners of the U.S., 11.2% of the U.S. GDP in 2007 was equivalent—according to the
WorldEconomicOutlookoftheInternationalMonetaryFund—to108%ofCanada’sGDP,46%ofChina’sGDP,and
151% of Mexico’s GDP.
14For the entire labor force there was a loss of about 1.52 million jobs during the same period.
15According to the IMF’s WEO database, the size of California’s economy in 2007 (in nominal U.S. dollars)
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Figure 2: Employment in California’s manufacturing industry
turing production in 1990, and for 11% by 2008. For our empirical analysis on job ﬂows to
be representative of the U.S. economy, we must demonstrate that California’s manufactur-
ing employment is highly correlated with national manufacturing employment. Using data
from the QCEW, Figure 2a presents the national and California’s manufacturing employment
from 1990 to 2008. California’s share of U.S. manufacturing employment was about 11.6%
in 1990 and 10.6% by 2008. The correlation coefﬁcient between California’s and the U.S.
employment-levelseriesis0.93. Moreover,thecorrelationcoefﬁcientbetweentheseries’ﬁrst
differences—the employment change from year to year—is 0.81. Hence, employment levels
and employment changes in California’s manufacturing industry track very well the national
manufacturing employment. Given this close relationship, we also expect that the job ﬂows
behavior in California mirrors the job ﬂows behavior in the rest of the country.
To verify the reliability of our job ﬂows data, we compare California’s manufacturing em-
ployment levels from the QCEW and the NETS. Figure 2b shows the two series from 1992 to
2004. The correlation is 0.82 for the employment levels and 0.68 for the ﬁrst differences. Al-
19Table 1: Job Flows Decomposition in California’s Manufacturing Industry
1992-1995 1993-1996 1994-1997 1995-1998 1996-1999
Employment at initial year 3,154,004 3,042,614 3,045,497 3,005,669 2,943,955
Employment at ﬁnal year 3,005,669 2,943,955 2,987,589 3,009,322 3,096,931
Change in employment
Due to expansions 331,996 373,782 404,602 446,388 431,332
Due to contractions -330,212 -315,076 -315,817 -299,356 -240,156
Due to births 261,941 285,588 300,333 268,853 306,224
Due to deaths -412,060 -442,953 -447,026 -412,232 -344,424
Net changes
Expansions-Contractions 1,784 58,706 88,785 147,032 191,176
Births-Deaths -150,119 -157,365 -146,693 -143,379 -38,200
Net employment creation -148,335 -98,659 -57,908 3,653 152,976
1997-2000 1998-2001 1999-2002 2000-2003 2001-2004
Employment at initial year 2,987,589 3,009,322 3,096,931 3,138,357 3,066,571
Employment at ﬁnal year 3,138,357 3,066,571 2,917,241 2,784,782 2,741,185
Change in employment
Due to expansions 417,172 341,024 320,243 284,628 297,535
Due to contractions -244,535 -284,767 -363,408 -386,536 -324,939
Due to births 353,832 373,596 295,118 210,197 150,339
Due to deaths -375,701 -372,604 -431,643 -461,864 -448,321
Net changes
Expansions-Contractions 172,637 56,257 -43,165 -101,908 -27,404
Births-Deaths -21,869 992 -136,525 -251,667 -297,982
Net employment creation 150,768 57,249 -179,690 -353,575 -325,386
though they are highly correlated, there is a substantial difference between the total employ-
mentlevelsinthetwoseries: theNETSdatareportsonaverage73%moreemployeesthanthe
QCEW data. Neumark, Zhang, and Wall (2007) and Neumark, Wall, and Zhang (2011) provide
an assessment of the NETS database and investigate, among other things, the difference in
total employment levels between NETS and the QCEW. They report that the difference arises
because the BLS data excludes self-employed workers and proprietors, and because NETS
hasbettercoverageofsmallestablishments. Withrespecttothelowercorrelationforemploy-
ment changes, they ﬁnd that there is some stickiness in the NETS data, and this is reﬂected
in year-to-year changes. For three-year windows, they obtain a correlation of 0.86 between
the two series. To sum up, we have strong evidence showing that the NETS data is a reliable
source for the analysis of job ﬂows in the U.S. manufacturing industry.
We can now present some stylized facts about the evolution of job ﬂows in our data. Table
1 shows the decomposition of job ﬂows in California’s manufacturing industry in three-year
windows. As in the work of Davis and Haltiwanger (1992), we obtain that net employment
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Figure 3: Employment creation and destruction in California’s manufacturing industry
(three-year windows)
employment. Figures 3 and 4 summarize these results.
Figure 3a presents the sources of job creation. We observe that job creation reached its
peak in the period 1997-2000 and then started a sharp decline, driven mostly by the decrease
in establishment births. Moreover, Figure 3b shows that expansions of existing establish-
ments were the principal source of job creation from 1992 to 2004, with an average share of
57%. On the other hand, Figure 3c shows that job destruction declined towards the second
half of the 1990s and then increased substantially during the 2000s. In Figure 3d we obtain
that on average 57% of job destruction is accounted for by the death of ﬁrms. Therefore, a
ﬁrst stylized fact about job ﬂows in the manufacturing industry is that from 1992 to 2004,
the intensive margin of employment dominates in job creation, while the extensive margin
dominates in job destruction.
Lastly, Figure 4 shows net employment changes at the intensive and extensive margins,
and overall. Note ﬁrst that the net effect at the intensive margin of employment (job creation
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Figure 4: Net employment creation in California’s manufacturing industry
2001 and has become negative since then. On the other hand, the net effect at the extensive
margin of employment (job creation by births minus job destruction by deaths) was nega-
tive throughout our three-year windows, with the exception of the period 1998-2001, when
it was positive but very close to zero. With respect to overall net employment changes, we
observe that the period of net job creation in the last part of the 1990s was driven by the
intensive margin, while the periods of net job destruction were dominated by the extensive
margin. Hence, we can write our second and third stylized facts about job ﬂows in the man-
ufacturing industry. The second stylized fact is that the period of net job creation during the
dot-com bubble was driven by the intensive margin of employment. From Table 1, note that
theintensivemarginimprovementsoverthatperiodweredriveninaboutsimilaramountsby
increasesinjobcreationbyexpansionsanddecreasesinjobdestructionbycontractions. The
thirdstylizedfact isthatthemost importantperiodofnet jobdestructioninthehistory ofthe
manufacturing industry (at the beginning of the 2000s) was driven mostly by the extensive
margin of employment. As seen in Table 1, the worsening of the extensive margin over that
period was the result of reinforcing changes in job destruction by deaths and job creation by
births, but the decline in job creation by births was much more important.
6 Estimation
This section presents the empirical analysis of the effects of input trade costs on the intensive
and extensive margins of employment. Input trade costs are constructed for each industry
using the output tariffs and the input-output table as is described in detail below. Besides
a tariff component, input trade costs comprise non-tariff components (e.g non-tariff trade
barriers). Nevertheless, and as mentioned by Treﬂer (2004), as long as there is a positive cor-
relation between tariff and non-tariff barriers, a decline in our tariff-based input-trade-cost
22measure would capture the general extent of input trade liberalization.16,17 Moreover, while
average tariffs for the U.S. are low, Yi (2003) shows that the possibility of vertical specializa-
tion creates a multiplier effect that is reﬂected in huge increases in trade volumes even for
small declines in tariffs.
Our empirical approach also controls for output trade costs, which allows us to gauge
the relative importance of the theoretical channels identiﬁed in our model (for changes in
input trade costs) with respect to the theoretical effects on job ﬂows obtained in the model of




estimation to test Predictions 1 and 2, and an industry-level estimation to test Predictions 3
and 4.
6.1 Description of Variables
The empirical analysis relies on establishment- and industry-level variables for the period
1992 to 2004. We obtain the establishment-level variables from NETS, and we obtain the
industry-level variables from the most updated versions of the trade database of Feenstra,
Romalis, and Schott (2002) and of the NBER productivity database (see Bartelsman and Gray,
1996).
As mentioned before, we have access to a subset of NETS—a longitudinal establishment-
level national database—which includes annual data for every establishment that was lo-
cated in California in any year between 1992 and 2004. Each establishment has a unique
identiﬁer and is carefully followed throughout the years.18 A distinguishing feature of NETS
is that it is not a representative sample of business establishments, but the universe of them.
Each establishment is classiﬁed by NETS according to its primary, secondary, and tertiary
Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation (SIC) code at the eight-digit level. We use the SIC primary
code to match each establishment to a unique industrial sector at the four-digit SIC level. We
drop from our database all the non-manufacturing establishments.19 Hence, each establish-
ment in this analysis belongs to one of 390 four-digit SIC manufacturing industries. For each
establishment we create job-ﬂow and productivity variables.
The job-ﬂow variables are created from reported employment levels. Following Davis,
Haltiwanger,andSchuh(1998),wecalculateestablishment-levelgrowthratesofemployment
16Treﬂer (2004) uses U.S. and Canadian tariffs in his plant-level employment regressions. He argues that even
if small, these tariffs are positively related to non-tariff barriers and hence, they capture the essence of the U.S.-
Canada free trade agreement.
17To the extent that the recent developments in transportation and communication technology have lowered
the cost of trading inputs, which are not captured by changes in input tariffs, our input-trade-cost measure is
going to underestimate the true change in the cost of importing inputs.
18In our dataset, an establishment is tracked all the years it is active as long as it was located in California for
one or more years.
19As we should expect, employment changes in the traded sector of the economy have a counterpart in the
non-traded sector. Ebenstein, Harrison, McMillan, and Phillips (2009) explore the mechanism of labor migration
from the traded to the non-traded sector and its impact on wages.
23using a midpoint-method formula. Denote the employment level of establishment i, from
industry j, in year t by Eijt. Then, the employment growth rate for this establishment from





where Eijt = 1
2(Eijt + Eijt 1). Note that ^ Eijt 2 [ 2;2], with a value of  2 reﬂecting job de-
struction by establishment death, and a value of 2 reﬂecting job creation by establishment
birth. Values in ( 2;2) indicate job destruction by contraction (negative values), job creation
byexpansion(positivevalues),ornochangeintheestablishment’semploymentlevel(avalue
of zero).
We can decompose ^ Eijt to obtain variables for the different components of job ﬂows. Let
jcijt and jdijt represent the rates of job creation and destruction, respectively, for establish-
ment i, from industry j, between t 1 and t. Given ^ Eijt, we deﬁne them as jcijt = max( ^ Eijt;0)
and jdijt = max(  ^ Eijt;0). Decomposing further jcijt and jdijt into the four components of
job ﬂows—those due to births (bijt) and deaths (dijt) at the extensive margin, and those due
to expansions (eijt) and contractions (cijt) at the intensive margin—we have
bijt =jcijt  1fjcijt = 2g
dijt =jdijt  1fjdijt = 2g
eijt =jcijt  1fjcijt < 2g
cijt =jdijt  1fjdijt < 2g;
where 1fg is an indicator function. Note that the following expressions always hold: ^ Eijt =
jcijt   jdijt, jcijt = bijt + eijt, and jdijt = dijt + cijt.
Our testable predictions 1 and 2 mention that the effect of a change in input trade costs
onﬁrm-leveljobﬂowsdependsoneachﬁrm’sproductivitylevel. Toverifythisempirically,we
require a variable measuring the relative productivity of each establishment. Using reported
salesandemploymentlevelsfromNETS,weconstructtherelativeproductivityvariablebased
on the ranking of the establishment’s sales per worker with respect to all the establishments
in the same four-digit SIC industry.20 Hence, we denote the relative productivity of estab-
lishment i, from industry j, at time t by 	ijt, where 	ijt 2 (0;2), taking the value of 1 for the
establishment with the median value of sales per worker in industry j at time t. This variable
is symmetric, with the lowest-productivity establishments in the industry taking values close
to zero, while the highest-productivity establishments take values close to 2.
Attheindustrylevel, themostimportantexplanatoryvariablesareinputandoutputtrade
20It would be preferable to use a productivity measure based on establishment-level total factor productivity.
Unfortunately,thoughgoodattrackingestablishments’employmentlevelsandsales,NETSprovidesfewvariables
on establishments’ characteristics. In particular, NETS does not report either capital stock or investment levels.
Also, we cannot calculate a value-added measure of productivity because we do not have data on establishments’
materialsconsumption. Nevertheless, forJapan’smanufacturingindustry, Tomiura(2007)showsthatirrespective
of the productivity measure used (either sales per worker, value-added labor productivity, or total factor produc-
tivity), the productivity ordering of ﬁrms by globalization modes does not change. Given these ﬁndings, we are
conﬁdent that our results would be robust to the use of alternative measures of ﬁrm productivity.
24costs. UsingtheupdatedU.S.tradedatabaseofFeenstra,Romalis,andSchott(2002),foreach
four-digit SIC industry we use the average tariff rate as our measure of output trade costs.
That is, the output trade cost for industry j in year t, 
O
jt, is the ratio of duties collected by U.S.
customs authorities to the free-on-board customs value of imports.
We follow Amiti and Konings (2007) and Goldberg, Khandelwal, Pavcnik, and Topalova
(2010), and construct an input tariff rate for each industry as a weighted average of output
tariff rates. Then, the input trade cost for industry j in year t, 
I









where the weight !kj is the ratio of industry j’s input purchases from industry k to the total
input purchases of industry j. We compute the weights from the U.S. input-output tables
created by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). There are two important remarks with re-
spect to our input trade-cost measure: ﬁrst, it is based on cost shares irrespective of whether
inputs are domestic or imported; and second, we keep the weights constant over time. With
respect to the ﬁrst remark, Amiti and Konings (2007) highlight that this is the correct mea-
sure of input trade costs—as opposed to a measure with weights based on shares of imported
inputs—because it gives more weight to the tariffs of inputs that are used more intensively
in an industry, whether those inputs are imported or not.21 With respect to the second re-
mark, although input-output tables are calculated every ﬁve years for the U.S. and it would
bepossibletolinkthemusinginterpolationmethods,keepingtheweightsconstantovertime
preventsanendogeneitybiascausedbythemovementsinoppositedirectionsofoutputtrade
costs and weights.22 We use the 1987 U.S. input-output table to calculate the weights for the
input trade costs used in our benchmark regressions, and perform robustness checks using
the 1997 input-output table.
Besides the key variables described above, the estimation methods in the following sec-
tions include other control variables. From NETS, we control for an establishment’s age and
sales per worker (deﬂated by industry-level price indexes); and from the NBER productiv-
ity database of Bartelsman and Gray (1996)—updated through 2004—we control for several
industry-level characteristics: the value and price of shipments, the price of materials, indus-
try employment levels, and industry total factor productivity (TFP). The purpose of these
industry-level variables is to control for the effects of labor demand shocks. Also, in the
industry-level estimation section below, we introduce industry-level job-ﬂow rates and mea-
sures of comparative advantage.
At the end, after merging the NETS data with the trade and productivity industry data,
21As an example, Amiti and Konings (2007) point out that if “an industry is intensive in rubber usage, the
relevant tariff is the tariff on rubber, irrespective of whether the rubber is imported.”
22To illustrate this point, consider an extreme example of an industry A that employs inputs from industries B
and C, with respective cost shares of 0.6 and 0.4. If we assume that the initial tariffs are 0.5 for industry B and 0.1
for industry C, the initial input tariff rate is 0.34. Now suppose that when the tariff for industry B declines to 0.4,
the cost share in industry A rises to 0.9. If we keep the weights constant, the new input tariff is 0.28, reﬂecting the
decline in input trade costs. On the other hand, if we use the new cost shares, the new input tariff would be 0.37,
which is above the original input tariff—missing entirely the decline in trade costs. Amiti and Konings (2007) and
Goldberg, Khandelwal, Pavcnik, and Topalova (2010) also keep the weights constant over time.
25our dataset contains 124,896 establishments from 390 four-digit SIC industries in the period
between 1992 and 2004.
6.2 Establishment-Level Estimation
In this section we perform an establishment-level regression analysis to test the reduced-
form Predictions 1 and 2, while also controlling for output trade costs. Our approach allows
for a direct comparison of the effects of input and output trade costs. Moreover, this analysis
sheds light on the relative importance of the three effects of input trade costs on job ﬂows
identiﬁed in section 4.1: the job-relocation effect, the productivity effect, and the market-
access effect.
6.2.1 Intensive-Margin Estimation
Prediction 1 states that a decline in input trade costs causes job destruction by contraction in
the least productive ﬁrms, and an ambiguous effect in the most productive ﬁrms. As this is a













jt 1	ijt 1 +#Zijt 1 +i +vt +"ijt; (35)
where yijt 2 feijt;cijt;eijt–cijtg is the intensive-margin job-ﬂow measure for establishment




jt 1 are lagged variables for the change in input and
output trade costs for industry j, 	ijt 1 is our relative productivity variable lagged one pe-
riod, Zijt 1 is a vector of lagged establishment- and industry-level characteristics, i and vt
account for establishment and time ﬁxed effects, and "ijt is an error term. The purpose of in-
cluding a lag in the right-hand side of equation (35) is simply to prevent situations in which a
change in the dependent variable happens before a change in one or more of the explanatory
variables.23




jt, we use three-year average






3 , with an analogous expression for 4
O
jt. The motiva-
tion for using three-year average changes is twofold: ﬁrst, it accounts for a lagged response
of ﬁrm-level employment to changes in trade costs, and second, it considers the apparent
stickiness in the NETS data mentioned in section 5. As a robustness check, in Appendix B we
re-estimate equation (35) using one-year changes in input and output trade costs.
The dependent variable can be eijt (for job expansions), cijt (for job contractions), or
eijt–cijt (for the net intensive-margin effect). The parameters of interest in each regression
are y
I and y
I, for y 2 fe;c;e–cg, because they characterize the intensive-margin response of
an establishment—given its productivity—to a change in input trade costs. In particular, the
semi-elasticityofjobﬂowcomponenty withrespecttoinputtradecostsforanestablishment
23For example, a change in employment might happen in February, while a change in trade costs might occur
in November of the same year. Without a lag, these changes would be treated as contemporaneous even though
the trade-cost change occurs later. We follow the same reasoning in all the regression speciﬁcations that appear
in the rest of the paper.




for 	 2 (0;2). Hence, after a one percentage point increase in input trade costs, job ﬂow y
changes by about y
I percent for the least productive ﬁrm, by y
I + y
I percent for the median
ﬁrm, and by about y
I + 2y
I percent for the most productive ﬁrm. We can then compare the
input-trade-cost semi-elasticity of a ﬁrm with productivity 	 against y
O + y
O	, which is that
ﬁrm’s output-trade-cost semi-elasticity.
Table 2 presents the results of the intensive-margin ﬁxed-effects regressions. We report
robust standard errors clustered at the establishment level. Given the construction of the
growth measures for job ﬂows, the coefﬁcients for the net-intensive-margin regression are
equivalent to the difference between the job-expansion and job-contraction regressions’ co-
efﬁcients. In each regression, both of the coefﬁcients on input trade costs are statistically sig-
niﬁcant at a 1% level. Moreover, they are consistent with Prediction 1: for a decrease in input
trade costs, the least productive establishments decrease their job expansions and increase
their job contractions, while the opposite happens for the most productive establishments.
Even for the median establishment (with a relative productivity of 1), a decline in input trade
costs causes a positive net effect at the intensive margin of job ﬂows (^ e c
I + ^ e c
I < 0). These
results suggest that a within-ﬁrm productivity effect does exist, which dominates the market-
access and job-relocation effects for the most productive (and even for the median) estab-
lishments.
Both coefﬁcients on output trade costs are also statistically signiﬁcant in each regression
and have the same signs as the input-trade-costs coefﬁcients. However, the output-trade-
costs coefﬁcients are smaller in magnitude. Figure 5 presents a detailed comparison of the
effects of input and output trade costs on the intensive margin of job ﬂows for each level of
establishment relative productivity. For y 2 fe;c;e–cg, the ﬁgures on the left present ^ y
I + ^ y
I	
and ^ y
O + ^ y
O	 with 95% conﬁdence bands, and the ﬁgures on the right show their difference,
^ y
I + ^ y
I	   (^ y
O + ^ y
O	), also with 95% conﬁdence bands. In the three cases, the effect of in-
put trade costs is more important than the effect of output trade costs for both the least and
more productive establishments. Note, for example, that for the least productive establish-
ment (	 ! 0 from the right), the input-trade-cost effect is 2.4 times as large as the output-
trade-cost effect on job expansions, 3.7 times as large for contractions, and 2.8 times as large
for the net intensive margin; while for the most productive establishment (	 ! 2 from the
left), the input-trade-cost effect is 1.9 times as large as the output-trade-cost effect for expan-
sions, 30 times as large for contractions, and 4 times as large for the net intensive margin.
For the median establishment, the input- and output-trade-cost effects are statistically dif-
ferent for job contractions and the net intensive margin, but not for job expansions. Indeed,
for job expansions the effects are not different for a wide range that covers the median and a
large segment of productivity levels above the median. Hence, for the median establishment,
the statistically signiﬁcant difference between the input- and output-trade-cost effects at the
net intensive margin is driven by the opposite responses of job contractions: while the me-
27Table 2: Intensive-Margin Estimation
Dependent variable (at time t) indicated in columns
Job expansions Job contractions Net intensive margin
Regressor (at t–1) (e) (c) (e–c)
4(Input trade cost) 2.660*** -1.895*** 4.555***
(0.327) (0.305) (0.469)
4(Input trade cost) -2.614*** 2.564*** -5.178***
(Relative productivity) (0.290) (0.256) (0.406)
4(Output trade cost) 1.087*** -0.513*** 1.600***
(0.175) (0.157) (0.243)
4(Output trade cost) -1.215*** 0.310** -1.524***
(Relative productivity) (0.161) (0.134) (0.219)
Establishment characteristic
4log(Sales per worker) 0.007*** -0.011*** 0.018***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Age -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001***
((0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Industry characteristic
4log(Value of shipments) 0.013** -0.008* 0.021***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008)
4log(Price of shipments) -0.013 -0.031*** 0.018
(0.011) (0.010) (0.016)
4log(Price of materials) -0.013 0.020** -0.033**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.015)
4log(Employment) 0.003 -0.005 0.008
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
4log(TFP) 0.012 -0.006 0.018*
(0.008) (0.007) (0.011)
Observations 758,812 758,812 758,812
Establishments 124,896 124,896 124,896
Notes: Regressions include establishment and time ﬁxed effects. Robust standard errors (in parenthe-
ses) are clustered at the establishment level. The coefﬁcients are statistically signiﬁcant at the *10%,
**5%, or ***1% level.
dian establishment decreases its job destruction by contraction after a one-percentage-point
decline in input trade costs (^ c
I + ^ c
I > 0), it will destroy more labor by contraction after a
one-percentage-point decline in output trade costs (^ c
O + ^ c
O < 0).
Overall, for ﬁrm-level expansion and contraction’s decisions, the previous results not only
are consistent with Prediction 1, but they also highlight the greater importance of input trade
costs—and their implied channels of inﬂuence—compared to output trade costs. That is, we
do obtain empirical support for the effects of ﬁnal-good trade costs on intensive-margin job
ﬂowsdescribedbyBernard, Redding, andSchott(2007)inastandardMelitzmodel—jobcon-
tractions of less productive ﬁrms and job expansions of more productive ﬁrms. Nevertheless,
the effects of input trade costs are in general larger.
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(c) Net intensive margin: semi-elasticities (left) and their difference (right)
Figure 5: Semi-elasticities with respect to input trade costs (solid) and output trade costs
(dashed), their difference (dotted), and 95% conﬁdence bands — Relative productivity on
the x-axis (median=1)
29establishment-level controls are statistically signiﬁcant at a 1% level. Increases in sales per
workerareassociatedwithmorejobexpansions, fewerjobcontractions, andhenceapositive
effect at the intensive margin. The coefﬁcients on age are all negative, suggesting that as
ﬁrms get older, they reduce their rates of both job expansion and job contraction, with the
former being larger in magnitude. For the industry-level controls, we obtain coefﬁcients with
expected signs but with limited statistical signiﬁcance. Given that we are controlling for the
growth in the price of shipments, the coefﬁcients on the growth of the value of shipments
indicate the response of establishment-level job ﬂows to the level of physical output in the
industry. Then, for higher growth in an industry, we obtain more job expansions, fewer job
contractions, and hence a net positive effect at the intensive margin. An increase in the price
of materials causes more job contractions and a negative net effect. And lastly, an increase in
total factor productivity causes a net positive effect at the intensive margin.
In Appendix B, we perform four types of robustness checks for our intensive-margin re-
sults. First, as mentioned above, we re-estimate equation (35) using one-year changes in
trade costs (instead of three-year average annual changes). Second, we re-estimate equation
(35) using weights for input trade costs based on the 1997 input-output table (instead of the
1987 U.S. input-output table). These two checks allow us to verify if our benchmark results
are sensitive to the measures of trade costs used. Third, we re-estimate equation (35) using
three-year windows. The purpose of this check is to verify if the year-to-year stickiness of the
NETS data mentioned in section 5 is an important determinant of the results. Fourth, we ver-
ify if our results are sensitive to the establishment- and industry-level controls included. In
all four cases, our results remain strong.
6.2.2 Death-Likelihood Estimation
The reduced-form Prediction 2 suggests that a decline in input trade costs should be associ-
atedwithanincreaseinthedeathprobabilityoflow-productivityﬁrms. Totestthisprediction





















2 takes the value of 1 if establishment i from industry j died at time t (and
zero otherwise), and the explanatory variables are deﬁned as in section 6.2.1. We estimate
equation (36) using probit and logit regression models, and thus F() denotes the cumulative
distribution function of either the standard normal distribution or the logistic distribution.
The regression model includes industry ﬁxed effects instead of establishment ﬁxed effects.24
The effect of input trade costs on the death probability of an establishment with relative
productivity 	 is determined by D
I + D
I 	, for 	 2 (0;2). However, as these parameters
belong to a nonlinear regression model, they do not represent semi-elasticities. The same is




24The probit and logit models cannot be estimated with establishment ﬁxed effects due to the so-called inci-
dental parameters problem (see Wooldridge, 2005).
30Table 3: Death-Likelihood Estimation
Regressor (at t–1) Probit Logit
4(Input trade cost) -6.610** -13.400**
(2.837) (5.752)
4(Input trade cost) 2.302 4.599
(Relative productivity) (2.187) (4.412)
4(Output trade cost) -4.468*** -8.983***
(1.330) (2.601)
4(Output trade cost) 2.329** 4.635**
(Relative productivity) (1.089) (2.134)
Establishment characteristic





4log(Value of shipments) 0.052 0.115
(0.054) (0.107)
4log(Price of shipments) -0.068 -0.132
(0.094) (0.189)








Notes: Regressions include industry and time ﬁxed effects. Robust standard
errors(inparentheses)areclusteredattheestablishmentlevel. Thecoefﬁcients
are statistically signiﬁcant at the *10%, **5%, or ***1% level.
els give similar results in terms of signs and the coefﬁcients’ statistical signiﬁcance. For the
input-trade-cost effect on an establishment’s death probability, the coefﬁcients have the ex-
pected signs (^ D
I < 0 and ^ D
I > 0). That is, after a decline in input trade costs, there is a larger
increase in the death probability of low-productivity establishments. However, the interac-
tion term is not statistically signiﬁcant. On the other hand, for the output-trade-cost effect,
bothcoefﬁcientshavetheexpectedsigns(^ D
O < 0and ^ D
O > 0)andarestatisticallysigniﬁcant.
Figure 6 presents the input- and output-trade-cost effects—along with 95% conﬁdence
bands—using the coefﬁcients of the probit regression.25 Consistent with Prediction 2, in Fig-
ure 6a we observe that although ^ D
I + ^ D
I 	 < 0 for every 	—a decline in input trade costs
is associated with an increase in the death probability of every type of establishment—the
effect is smaller in magnitude and not statistically signiﬁcant for the most productive estab-
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(b) Difference between effects
Figure 6: The effects of trade costs in a Probit death-likelihood regression, with 95%
conﬁdence bands — Relative productivity on the x-axis (median=1)
lishments. Comparing the two trade-cost effects, Figures 6a and 6b show that despite the
larger magnitude of the input-trade-cost effect, the difference between them is not statisti-
cally signiﬁcant for every value of 	.
Our results for the effect of output trade costs on the death probability of establishments
are similar to the results of Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006b), and hence provide sup-
port for the theoretical channels identiﬁed in the heterogeneous-ﬁrm models of trade in ﬁnal
goods of Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003) and Melitz (2003). But also, our results
showthatweshouldnotignoretheeffectofinputtradecostsanditsimpliedchannelofinﬂu-
ence. Inourmodel, ﬁrmsdieafteradeclineininputtradecostsbecauseofthemarket-access
effect: as low-productivity ﬁrms lose market share to new and existing importing ﬁrms, their
proﬁts decline, and ﬁrms that are not able to cover their ﬁxed costs of production die.
Among the coefﬁcients on the establishment- and industry-level control variables, only
age and the change in industry employment are statistically signiﬁcant (in both the probit
and logit regressions). The coefﬁcient on age implies that as an establishment gets older, the
probabilityofdyingdeclines. Similarly,thecoefﬁcientonthechangeinindustryemployment
shows that establishments in expanding industries are less likely to die.
In Appendix B we perform the same robustness checks we did for the intensive-margin
regressions in section 6.2.1. In each of the alternative speciﬁcations, we obtain results that
are similar to the results presented here.
6.3 Industry-Level Estimation
In this section we do an industry-level regression analysis to test the reduced-form Predic-
tions 3 and 4. After a decline in input trade costs, Prediction 3 states that the number of
32establishments decreases, and Prediction 4 states that there is job destruction at the exten-
sive margin, an ambiguous effect at the intensive margin, and overall net job destruction. As
before, we control for output trade costs. Moreover, following Bernard, Redding, and Schott
(2007), who ﬁnd in their model that responses of industry-level employment to changes in
trade costs depend on comparative advantage, we create variables of industry-level compar-
ative advantage and interact them with input and output trade costs. Before presenting the
econometric model, ﬁrst we describe the industry-level measures that we use as our depen-
dent variables, and then we discuss our comparative-advantage variables.
LetNjt andEjt denote,respectively,thenumberofactiveestablishmentsandtheemploy-
ment level in industry j at time t. Hence, the growth rate of the number of establishments in
industry j from time t 1 to time t is ^ Njt =
Njt Njt 1
Njt 1 , with a similar expression for the indus-
try’s employment growth rate, ^ Ejt. To test Prediction 3, the only dependent variable we need
is ^ Njt. On the other hand, to test Prediction 4 we need to decompose ^ Ejt into its industry-
level job-ﬂow components. In particular, as the change in the employment level in industry j
from time t 1 to time t, Ejt, is due to establishments’ expansions, contractions, births and
deaths, we can write ^ Ejt as
^ Ejt = ejt   cjt + bjt   djt;
where ejt denotes the contribution of expansions to the industry’s employment growth rate,
andthesameforcontractions(cjt),births(bjt),anddeaths(djt). Wecalculateeachtermasthe
change in the industry’s employment due to the particular job-ﬂow type (in absolute value)
divided by the industry’s total employment in t 1. We obtain all these measures by doing an
aggregation of the NETS data at the four-digit SIC level.
Based on the database of Bartelsman and Gray (1996), we create two rankings of compar-
ative advantage for U.S. industries. Under the premise that the U.S. is a country with relative
abundance of skilled labor, the ﬁrst comparative-advantage ranking is based on the ratio of
non-production workers to total employment. To create this ranking, we get the ratio of non-
production workers for each industry in 1992 (the ﬁrst year in our NETS data), and then order
the industries in the interval (0;2): the industry with the lowest level takes a value close to
zero, the median industry takes the value of 1, and the industry with the highest level takes a




become more productive to be better prepared to compete in an international setting. Then,
we rank industries by their total factor productivity growth in the period between 1980 and
1992,andplacethemintheinterval(0;2)usingthesameprocedureaswiththeotherranking.
We denote the TFP growth ranking for industry j with 2j.






















^ Njt; ^ Ejt;ejt;cjt;ejt–cjt;bjt;djt;bjt–djt
o
is the dependent variable for industry j




jt 1 are deﬁned as in section 6.2.1, mj 2 (0;2), for m 2 f1;2g, is the
industry j’s value in ranking m of comparative advantage, Zjt 1 is a vector of lagged industry-
level characteristics, j and vt account for industry and time ﬁxed effects, and "jt is an error
term.
In a spirit similar to the establishment-level regressions, the parameters that describe the
effects of input trade costs on dependent variable y are y
I , y
I1, and y
I2. In particular, for an
industry with measures of comparative advantage given by 1 and 2, the semi-elasticity of















an industry with very high comparative advantage (with 1 and 2 close to 2). We can then
compare the input-trade-cost semi-elasticity for this industry, against its output-trade-cost




An important consideration in our industry-level estimation is the possibility that indus-
tries’ lobbying groups might look for trade protection when there are employment losses,
making tariff rates endogenous.26 Hence, besides including industry and time ﬁxed effects,
whichcontrolforunobservedindustrycharacteristicsandothergeneraltradepolicychanges,
we estimate equation (37) using an instrumental variables (IV) approach.27 Under the pre-
misethatindustriesindisadvantagelobbyformoreprotection,Treﬂer(1993)suggeststheuse
ofindustry-levelcomparative-advantagemeasurestoinstrumentfortradebarriers. However,
in our case these measures are not valid instruments, as one of the main arguments in our
industry-level estimation is that comparative advantage matters for industry-level job ﬂows.
Hence, we rely on the use of lagged values of changes in trade costs and lagged levels of aver-
age trade costs as instruments (see Appendix B for an instruments’ list and more details).
Table4presentstheindustry-levelestimationresults. WeestimateeachIVﬁxed-effectsre-
gression using as weights the number of establishments in each industry in 1992. We present
robust standard errors clustered at the industry level. Each regression in Table 4 satisﬁes
the requirements of relevance and exogeneity of the instruments. Our IV regressions have
identical ﬁrst-stage results, as they have the same endogenous variables and use the same
instruments and control variables. With respect to the instruments’ relevance, the ﬁrst-stage
26Thereisalargeliteratureonendogenoustradeprotection. Theoretically,themodelof“protectionforsale”of
Grossman and Helpman (1994) provides a framework to analyze this issue. Using U.S. data, Goldberg and Maggi
(1999) ﬁndsupport for theGrossman-Helpman model. Also forthe U.S., Treﬂer(1993) ﬁnds thatestimates for the
effect of trade protection on imports are much larger once endogeneity is taken care of.
27Asitisunlikelythatindividualestablishmentsaffecttradepolicy, wedonotconsidertheproblemofendoge-
nous protection in our establishment-level estimation. Supporting this view, Treﬂer (2004) uses plant-level data
from Canada, and ﬁnds that endogeneity of tariffs is strongly rejected in his plant-level speciﬁcations for employ-
ment growth and labor productivity. As he puts it, “this likely reﬂects the fact that tariffs, even if endogenous to









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































35results—presented in Appendix B—strongly reject the null hypothesis of underidentiﬁcation
and show very large F-statistics (between 35 and 66).28 With respect to the instruments’ ex-
ogeneity, the last row in each column in Table 4 presents the p-value from Hansen’s J-test of
overidentifying restrictions. The null hypothesis that the instruments are exogenous cannot
be rejected for any of the regressions (the larger the p-value, the better).
The ﬁrst column in Table 4 concerns Prediction 3. In that regression, two of the three
estimated coefﬁcients on input trade costs are statistically signiﬁcant at a 5% level. The
third coefﬁcient—on the interaction between the change in input trade costs and the TFP
ranking—has the same sign as the interaction term based on the ratio of non-production
workers. These estimates stress the importance of comparative advantage for Prediction 3:
after a decline in input trade costs, there is a decrease in the number of establishments only
in industries with comparative disadvantage (with low levels for 1 and 2). Figure 7 looks
furtherintotherelationshipbetweencomparativeadvantageandtheresponseofthenumber
of establishments to changes in trade costs. Assuming that 1 = 2 = , Figure 7a presents
^ 
^ N
I + (^ 
^ N
I1 + ^ 
^ N
I2) and ^ 
^ N
O + (^ 
^ N
O1 + ^ 
^ N
O2), along with 95% conﬁdence bands. Note that the
semi-elasticity with respect to input trade costs is negative and statistically signiﬁcant at a
5% level for industries with comparative advantage (with a large ), implying an increase in
the number of establishments after a decline in input trade costs. This result for industries
withcomparativeadvantagedoesnotsupportPrediction3, suggestingthattheeffectofinput
trade costs on the entry of ﬁrms varies by the type of industry. In comparison, the estimated
semi-elasticities with respect to output trade costs move in the opposite direction and are
much smaller in magnitude, though they are not statistically signiﬁcant at a 5% level for any
level of comparative advantage. Figure 7b shows that the difference between the input- and
output-trade-cost effects is statistically different from zero for most levels of comparative ad-
vantage.
The rest of the columns in Table 4 concern Prediction 4. For the net effect on employment
growth, note that the signs and relative magnitudes of the three estimated coefﬁcients on in-
put trade costs are similar to the coefﬁcients for the input-trade-cost effect on the number of
establishments. The ﬁrst coefﬁcient is, however, statistically signiﬁcant only at a 10% level. A
plot of the input-trade-cost semi-elasticities looks very similar to what we observe in Figure
7a, but the 95% conﬁdence band contains the value of zero for every level of comparative
advantage—a 90% conﬁdence band, on the other hand, does not contain the value of zero
for levels of  below 0.32. Hence, after a decline in input trade costs, we obtain a statisti-
cally signiﬁcant (at a 10% level) decrease in employment only for industries with substantial
comparative disadvantage.
In the rest of the regressions in Table 4, the estimated coefﬁcients on input trade costs are
weak in terms of statistical signiﬁcance: only two coefﬁcients are statistically signiﬁcant at a
28A rejection of the null hypothesis of underidentiﬁcation implies that the instruments are correlated with the
endogenous variables; i.e. they are relevant. With clustered standard errors, the underidentiﬁcation test is based
on the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic. We obtain a value of 42.73 for the statistic, with a p-value of zero. We
cannot carry out the weak identiﬁcation test suggested by Stock and Yogo (2005) for two reasons: (1) we have six
endogenous variables, while Stock and Yogo present critical values for up to three endogenous regressors; and (2)
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Figure 7: The effects of trade costs on the number of establishments, with 95% conﬁdence
bands — Industry comparative-advantage ranking on the x-axis (median=1)
10% level, one in the expansions regression and one in the net-extensive-margin regression.
However, based on the signs and relative magnitudes, we can describe a general pattern of
their contribution in the net employment growth results.29 In accordance with the previous
empiricalresults,thecoefﬁcientshavetheexpectedsigns. Forindustrieswithseverecompar-
ative disadvantage, a decline in input trade costs is associated with lower rates of job creation
(^ e
I > 0 and ^ b
I > 0), and higher rates of job destruction (^ c
I < 0 and ^ d
I < 0). Neverthe-
less, the response of the job destruction rates is by far smaller, and therefore, the net effects
at the intensive and extensive margins are mostly determined by expansions and births, re-
spectively. Thus, these results indicate that after a decline in input trade costs, the decrease
in employment in industries with comparative disadvantage occurs through less job creation
rather than through more job destruction. With respect to the contribution of each margin of
employment to the net employment response to input trade costs, the regression results do
not show any remarkable difference between them (^ e c
I is similar to ^ b d
I , and ^ e c
I1 + ^ e c
I2 is
close to ^ b d
I1 + ^ b d
I2 ).
Thenetintensive-marginresultsattheestablishmentlevelinsection6.2.1showthathigh-
productivity ﬁrms have net expansions after a decline in input trade costs, giving support
to the existence of a strong productivity effect. In the model, the productivity effect could
dominate the market-access and job-relocation effects in the differentiated-good industry,
and hence the net effect at the intensive margin is ambiguous. Empirically, based on the
only statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcient on input trade costs in the expansions regression, ^ e
I,
we do not ﬁnd evidence of a dominating productivity effect in industries with comparative
29Note that the coefﬁcients of the regression of net employment growth are equal to the sum of the coefﬁ-
cients of the net intensive-margin regression and the net extensive-margin regression. The difference between
the coefﬁcients from the expansions regression and the contractions regression gives the coefﬁcients for the net
intensive-margin regression. The same is true for the births, deaths, and net extensive-margin regressions.
37disadvantage.30
In the probability-of-death regressions in section 6.2.2, we ﬁnd an increase in the death
probability of low-productivity ﬁrms after a decline in input trade costs. The industry-level
regression for the number of establishments shows that in comparative disadvantage indus-
tries, there are indeed establishments that die and are not replaced—the number of estab-
lishments in these industries falls. However, the small and statistically insigniﬁcant effect
in the industry-level death rate suggests that the employment destroyed by the dying estab-
lishments is minimal—i.e. the establishments that die are very small and do not have an
important effect on industry-level total employment.
For the semi-elasticities with respect to output trade costs, note that the estimated coef-
ﬁcients in the net-employment-growth regression are smaller in magnitude than the input-
trade-costscoefﬁcients, butalso,theyhaveoppositesigns. Theoutput-trade-costsresultsare
driven mainly—in sign, magnitude, and signiﬁcance—by the expansions regression, whose
estimatedcoefﬁcientsonoutputtradecostsarehighlysigniﬁcant. Theresultsimplythatafter
a decline in output trade costs, there is net employment creation in industries with compara-
tivedisadvantage. ThisresultistheoppositeofthetheoreticalresultofBernard,Redding,and
Schott (2007), who ﬁnd that trade liberalization causes net job destruction in disadvantaged
industries, andnetjobcreationinadvantagedindustries. Intheirmodel, bothtypesofindus-
tries havesimultaneous jobcreation and destruction after adecline inoutput trade costs: job
destruction from low-productivity ﬁrms that are dying or contracting, and job expansions
from new and existing high-productivity exporting ﬁrms. The job-destruction effect dom-
inates in comparative-disadvantage industries, and the opposite happens in comparative-
advantage industries. In section 6.2 we ﬁnd empirical support for the ﬁrm-level predictions
of Bernard, Redding, and Schott: after a decline in output trade costs, there are net job ex-
pansions in high-productivity establishments, net job contractions in low-productivity es-
tablishments, and a higher probability of death in low-productivity establishments. At the
industry level, however, the empirical results suggest that the job-creation effect from high-
productivity establishments dominates in comparative-disadvantage industries.
Although a formal explanation of the previous result is out of the scope of this paper, we
provide a possible explanation. In Figure 5a, note that a decrease in output trade costs is re-
latedtostatisticallysigniﬁcantjobexpansionsevenforﬁrmsjustabovethemedian(i.e. about
50% of establishments have a statistically signiﬁcant increase in their job-expansion rate).
Taking into account the effect on the establishment-level job-contraction rate, the net effect
in Figure 5c shows statistically signiﬁcant net job expansions for establishments with a rela-
tive productivity ranking of 1.24 or higher (about 38% of establishments). These proportions
are very high to be explained solely by exporting ﬁrms—according to Bernard, Jensen, Red-
ding, andSchott(2007), only18%ofU.S.manufacturingﬁrmswereexportingin2002. Hence,
there must be other channels of job expansion through which (exporting and non-exporting)
medium- and high-productivity establishments respond after a decline in output trade costs.
30The signs and magnitudes of the input-trade-cost interaction terms in the expansions regression suggest
that the productivity effect becomes stronger in comparative advantage industries. However, that result lacks
statistical signiﬁcance.
38Asoutputtradecostsarerelatedtotradeinﬁnalgoods,oneofthesechannelsmightberelated
to ﬁrm-level reactions to increases in competition in the ﬁnal-goods market. In an industry
with a comparative disadvantage, the competitive pressures from new foreign ﬁrms (after a
decline in trade barriers) are higher than in comparative-advantage industries. Medium- and
high-productivity ﬁrms—independently of their exporting status—could react by aggresively
expanding their operations in order to protect their market share, creating another channel
for job expansions after a decline in output trade costs. In a similar spirit, Lawrence (2000)
ﬁnds that international competition increased productivity in unskilled-labor-intensive in-
dustries in the U.S. manufacturing sector and suggests that this productivity growth is biased
in favor of unskilled workers.31
The regressions include the same industry-level controls that we used in the estimation
at the establishment level, plus the log change in the ratio of non-production (NP) workers,
and without the log change in industry employment. As the employment net growth and the
log change in employment are basically the same variable, the use of the lagged log change
would introduce a lagged dependent variable bias in the job-ﬂow regressions. Therefore, we
useinsteadthesecondlagofthelogindustry-levelemployment,whichhelpsustocontrolfor
possible trends in employment growth rates. For the other explanatory variables, only the log
changes in the prices of shipments and materials are signiﬁcant in three or more regressions.
The estimated coefﬁcients indicate that the employment growth rate increases in industries
with increasing prices and decreases (along with the number of establishments) in industries
with increasing prices of materials.
The industry-level estimation is less efﬁcient than the establishment-level estimation.
The robustness checks in Appendix B support our industry-level results, though they have
very limited statistical signiﬁcance. A lesson from the job-ﬂow literature is that aggregate
employment changes hide substantial movements in gross job ﬂows. But also, as obtained
here and pointed out by Levinsohn (1999), even industry-level gross job ﬂows hide relevant
and efﬁcient ﬁrm-level information that is obscured as we aggregate the data.
7 Conclusions
Input trade has changed the international trade landscape. As such, its effects on labor mar-
kets have been subject to intense academic and public debate. In this paper, we contribute
to this debate by showing how declines in input trade costs affect job ﬂows at the ﬁrm and
industry levels. Our analysis followed both theoretical and empirical routes.
Our heterogeneous-ﬁrm model makes sharp predictions for the effects of input trade
costs on job ﬂows. In particular, we identify three basic effects of input trade costs that are
absent in a standard Melitz’s model of trade in ﬁnal goods: a market-access effect, a job re-
31Lawrence argues that productivity growth in industries competing with developing countries is biased in
favor of unskilled workers, as U.S. ﬁrms try to emulate production processes from countries that do not use skill-
intensive technologies. He mentions that “we would not expect technological changes in developed countries
such as the United States to use more capital- or skill-intensive production methods when experiencing compe-
tition from developing countries.”
39location effect, and a productivity effect. After a decline in input trade costs, the ﬁrst two
effects generate ﬁrm-level job destruction, while the productivity effect can generate job ex-
pansionsforimportingﬁrms. Intheend, themodelpredictsdeathsandcontractionsforlow-
productivity ﬁrms, an ambiguous effect for (high-productivity) importing ﬁrms, a decline in
the industry’s number of ﬁrms, and overall net job destruction.
Using the universe of establishments in California’s manufacturing industry from 1992 to
2004, we ﬁnd evidence consistent with the ﬁrm-level reduced-form predictions of the model.
On the other hand, we ﬁnd empirical support for the industry-level predictions only in in-
dustries with comparative disadvantage. That is, our empirical evidence shows that industry
comparative advantage matters for the industry-level effects of input trade cost on job ﬂows.
For simplicity, our model does not consider industry-level heterogeneity. However, it can be
extendedinthedirectionoftheHeckscher-OhlinmodelwithheterogeneousﬁrmsofBernard,
Redding, and Schott (2007).
After controlling for output trade costs in our empirical analysis, we ﬁnd that the effects
of input trade costs are more important. First, they matter more for establishment-level de-
cisions on expansions and contractions for most levels of ﬁrms’ relative productivity. Sec-
ond,theyhavealargerimpactthanoutputtradecostsintheprobability-of-deathregressions,
though the difference is not statistically signiﬁcant. Third, input and output trade costs have
opposite effects in the industry-level analysis, but the effects of input trade costs are stronger.
In comparison with the channels identiﬁed in heterogeneous-ﬁrm models of trade in ﬁnal
goods, our empirical results suggest a higher relevance for job ﬂows of the input-trade-costs
channels identiﬁed in our model.
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